

**U.S. MILITARY BASES OVERSEAS:  
WHAT DO THE CURRENT TRENDS SHOW?**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis is concerned with the changing nature of U.S. basing structure overseas. This basing structure has been changing dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The changes that are occurring though are not uniform across all the different regions and countries that are hosting U.S. military bases. Because of this lack of uniformity, the existing theories and explanations cannot sufficiently explain why these changes are occurring and what they mean. What this thesis finds is that no single theory or explanation is enough for understanding the changing basing structure. What is needed is the use of different combinations of these theories to explain the different changes in certain regions and countries.

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## Introduction

“One of the oldest and most enduring permanent features of relations between nations is that of basing access, ad hoc or long-term, for military forces.”<sup>1</sup> That was the first sentence in Robert E Harkavy’s book ‘Strategic Basing and the Great Power, 1200-2000’ in which he carried out an in-depth study of the history and development of military bases over the past 800 years. That line aptly sums up the importance of military basing in international relations and why they need to be thoroughly understood.

Historically, bases have existed for a very long time. They seem to be a very important factor in determining hegemonic power as they allow for the projection of power in far away regions. Its clear that a state can be a global power yet not have much of a basing structure as was seen with the U.S. in the interwar period. During the interwar period, the U.S. was a considerable power, but because it did not desire a role as a major power or hegemon, it did not maintain much of a basing structure,<sup>2</sup> it only possessed the bases that it acquired from Spain in the Spanish-American war of 1892. This seems to indicate that the bases are not necessarily an indicator of a state being powerful, but of its desire and capability to project that power overseas.

Military basing has existed for a very long time in history. Rivalry over basing structure existed as far back as the Greek period, when during the Peloponnesian wars

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<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Basing and the Great Powers 1200-2000*. London: Routledge, 2007. Print. (Henceforth: Harkavy.)

<sup>2</sup> Harkavy.

there was competition to secure basing access through alliances. The Chinese Admiral Zheng He, during the fifteenth century established bases as far as East Africa and the Persian Gulf when he took a large fleet across the Indian Ocean. The Mongolian empire used bases in modern day Vietnam and Korea in order to launch offensives against Japan and Southeast Asia. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw intense rivalries for basing access in the Mediterranean between states such as Venice, Genoa and the Ottoman Empire. All the previous powers just mentioned were, according to Harkavy, regional powers. Portugal on the other hand can be considered to be the first to have maintained a truly global basing network stretching to India, making it a hegemon on a global scale. Most of the basing access that was acquired in the past was done through either conquest or through economic relations, during the cold war on the other hand, basing access was usually granted through ideological separation and alliances except for a few cases of outright dominance or conquest such as the soviet union with Mongolia. During the Cold War, basing access seems to be granted more on the basis of ideological leanings, where countries were mostly lumped into 2 competing camps and access was granted more easily. since the end of the cold war, basing access came to be established through diplomatic basis and quid pro quo arrangements.<sup>3</sup>

Since the end of World War II the U.S. has had a massive basing structure spanning the globe. What seems to be strange in the current trends that are seen in the U.S. basing structure after the Cold War is that the number of bases have been decreasing but that the decline in the number of U.S. military sites is not spread evenly through different regions and countries; some countries and regions are seeing increases while

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<sup>3</sup> See Harkavy for in-depth information on military bases; their uses, types, acquisitions and retentions, dating back to the 1200s.

other have seen decreases in certain type of military sites.<sup>4</sup> The question then is, what is actually happening with the U.S. basing structure overseas? And what are the best methods to explaining these changes while accounting for the nuances that are witnessed regionally and between specific countries?

This change in the number of military bases can be explained through several theories, including the imperial overstretch, long-cycle theory and other explanations that help us understand why the number of bases are changing. The problem with these theories is that they tend to focus on the number of overall bases overseas and are only able explain general changes in the basing strategy but cannot account for certain anomalies that don't appear to fit into the explanation provided by these theories.

Some of the changes that are being witnessed include the increase in the number of large bases in some countries such as Germany and Japan, when theories such as imperial overstretch expects to see declining numbers or an elimination of the U.S. basing strategy altogether.<sup>5</sup> We are also supposed to see a decrease in the number of states hosting U.S. bases because of the de-legitimization that the U.S. is supposed to be experiencing according to the long-cycle theory advanced by Modelski and is used by Monteleone to argue that the U.S is in decline because there are fewer military bases overseas<sup>6</sup>, but we see the general number of host states remain relatively constant from 2001 to 2013. Another anomaly in the changing basing structure is that

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<sup>4</sup> All data on military sites from 2001-2013 is taken from the Department of Defense *Base Structure Report*, for each fiscal year

<sup>5</sup> Paul K. MacDonald, and Joseph M. Parent. "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment." *International Security* Vol. 35, No. 4 (spring 2011): 7-44. (Henceforth: MacDonald and Parent)

<sup>6</sup> Carla Monteleone, "Impact and Perspectives of American Bases in Italy." *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. Vol. 51. Amsterdam: IOS, 2009. 127-145. Print. (Henceforth: Monteleone)

Japan has seen an overall increase in the number of military sites since 2001, despite the overall decrease in the number of military sites overseas. The theory of base politics that was advanced by Cooley is very adept at explaining many of these local changes that we see, since it explains these changes through differences in the host state's domestic political situation rather than through the changes with the hegemon.<sup>7</sup> Despite this, the theory of base politics cannot explain the overall decrease in the number of bases that we see in South Korea. These nuances in the regional picture of basing need to be explained using something other than the current theories that exist. These changes in the basing structure of the U.S. can only be explained using an amalgamation of these theories along with other factors such as the changing strategic environment and the advancing technological capabilities of the military. Applying different combinations of explanations and theories to specific scenarios will allow us to understand these individual changes better.

We must understand the changes that are occurring in the basing structure of the U.S. and how those bases are used because those changes may inform us more about how military bases are used in today's world. They also might be a useful indicator to the capabilities of the hegemon and the support (or lack thereof) from other states. Overseas military bases are an emblem of global powers, so by understanding bases better, we could understand what changes are occurring to the international order as well.

In order to begin explaining and understanding the changes that are occurring in the U.S. overseas basing, this thesis will examine published reports, the Base Structure Reports by the Department of Defense (DoD). Those reports, which contain data on

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<sup>7</sup> Alexander Cooley, *Base politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, E-book. 2008. Ch.: 4. (Henceforth: Cooley)



all the sites that the DoD operates, will be analyzed for changes occurring over the years in certain regions and specific countries. These changes will then be explained using some of the theories mentioned earlier in order to see which ones, or combinations of theories, best explain these changes.

Chapter one will be concerned with the detailing the available theories and explanations that can help us understand the changes that are occurring in the basing structure of the U.S., the argument that is being made in this thesis and finally a note on the data that is being used for the analyses. Chapter two will detail the history of U.S. military basing strategy as well as the strategic benefits derived from the possession of these bases. Chapter three will be focused on changes in Europe, specifically Germany and the Southern European region. Chapter four will focus on the changes occurring in Asia, with a specific focus on Japan and South Korea. Finally, chapter five will be concerned with the basing structure in South America and the Africa – Middle East regions.

# Chapter 1: Debate, Literature Review and Methodology

## 1.1 Debate on Decline

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has emerged as the sole power in the world. This had some like Krauthammer claiming that “the center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.”<sup>8</sup> This, acknowledged Krauthammer, is probably not going to be a permanent fixture of the new world system. Indeed, he also questions the durability of American unipolar presence and if it will indeed succumb to imperial overstretch. Since then there have been many arguments that the unipolar moment is coming to an end and that the U.S. must begin limiting its involvement in global affairs and commitments to its allies in order to strategically retrench. They argue that the US should alter its strategy willingly rather than have change brought upon it by some major crises.<sup>9</sup>

There are different levels of retrenchment that have been advocated by different thinkers. Some advocates of retrenchment have argued that retrenchment is desirable for the U.S. but that it might have detrimental effects on global politics.<sup>10</sup> Other have argued that retrenchment can and should be carried out, and that the benefits of retrenchment are generally overlooked.<sup>11</sup> Layne has argued that the “epoch of American dominance is drawing to a close”<sup>12</sup> and that the US is increasingly unable to continue its hegemonic role. Layne points to the fact the China has had a much more rapid growth than the US and that it is

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<sup>8</sup> Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Winter 1990/1991): 23–33.

<sup>9</sup> Christopher Layne, “Graceful Decline.” *The American Conservative*, May 2010. <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/graceful-decline/> (accessed May 7, 2014). (Henceforth: Layne 2010.)

<sup>10</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *The post-American world*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2008.

<sup>11</sup> MaDonald and Parent.

<sup>12</sup> Layne 2010, Paragraph 4.

predicted that it will overtake the US as the largest economy as measured in GDP around 2020.

This debate on decline has also been concerned with the presence of U.S. military bases as an indicator of U.S. decline. Some have argued that the declining number of U.S. bases overseas is an indicator of increased resistance to U.S. global power and the application of cost-imposing strategies by denying basing access to the U.S. and that this is an indicator of its decline as a hegemon.<sup>13</sup> Despite the general decrease in the number of U.S. military bases overseas, there are many anomalies that can't be explained, such as the increase in the number of bases in Japan, or the increased number of 'large' military sites in Germany.

The next section will detail the different theories and explanations that might help us understand the current changes, what their shortcomings are and how a better method can be used to explain these changes.

## **1.2 Possible Answers to the Puzzle of Changing U.S. Basing Structure**

### **1.2.1 Long-Cycle Theory**

There are some theories that might help in the understanding of how the military basing structure of a country changes. According to Modelski's 'long-cycle' theory, there are historically a series of global wars, which result in the rise of a global power that is able to shape and influence the global political system and order. Global wars according to Modelski, result from a lack of organization and hierarchy, or in other words, anarchy. After a global war, a power that is able to take advantage of the gains

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<sup>13</sup> Monteleone.

that it made during the global war is able to establish itself as the dominant world power. In the space of a generation, new powers rise and begin to challenge the dominant power which itself begins losing authority, and the world system begins to move from unipolarity to a multipolar system. In this multipolar world, extreme competition between the rising states takes place and results in further deterioration of order, and finally the system returns to anarchy where another global war occurs and another global power appears.<sup>14</sup> This rise and fall of global powers occur in a long cycle that consists of four phases: 1) Execution phase where a global power with absolute power emerges after a global war. 2) Agenda-setting phase where new powerful states begin to emerge, and challenge the current global power because of increased dissatisfaction. 3) Coalition-building phase where new alliances rise and the system becomes more multipolar. 4) Macro-decision phase where two coalitions confront each other, a new global war takes place and a new global power emerges. Many seem to believe that the U.S. is at the moment in the second phase of the long cycle: Agenda-Setting. Some have argued that de-legitimization of the U.S. in this phase can occur through cost-imposing strategies such as the limiting of basing access. Turkey is used as an example of this cost-imposing strategy when it limited access of its bases to the U.S. during Operation Iraqi Freedom.<sup>15</sup> Others have concurred with the assessment that the U.S. is currently in its second phase of hegemonic power and that indeed the declining number of bases overseas coupled with request by some nations to shut down U.S. bases is evidence of the de-

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<sup>14</sup> George Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global politics and the Nations-State." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* Vol. 20, No. 2, 1978: 217. (Henceforth: Modelski)

<sup>15</sup> Randall L. Schweller, and Pu, Xiaoyu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline" *International Security* Vol. 36, No.1 (Summer 2011): 41—72. (Henceforth: Schweller and Pu)

legitimization of the U.S. as a global power.<sup>16</sup> If this is the case, then we should expect to see a continuing decline in the number of U.S. bases, the number of host states and also the number of security agreements that the U.S. has with other countries.

The problem with using this method to understanding the changing U.S. basing structure is that it relies heavily on the changing numbers of U.S. bases overseas as well as the actions by certain countries such as Turkey. These are used to justify the belief that the U.S. is currently in decline and in its third phase as a hegemon, the phase of coalition building, which will result in a multi-polar world and loss in the legitimacy of the U.S. as a global power. This method might be adequate at explaining a few instances of base reduction, but neglects to take into account the issues with the domestic politics of the host countries that are involved with the shutting down or scaling back of the U.S. bases in their countries. This also neglect to consider the changing security environment and the changing technological capabilities of the military in its ability to project power further without the permanent presence of troops around the world. Finally, if the case of the de-legitimization of the U.S. is truly ongoing, then we should expect across the board cuts to all military bases, troop presence, number of host countries and security agreements which is not the case since there are wide variations to the changing structure of U.S. basing overseas.

### **1.2.2 Imperial overstretch and Retrenchment**

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<sup>16</sup> Monteleone.

Another explanation for the changing numbers of U.S. bases is the idea of imperial overstretch. Within his writing, Modelski identifies what he calls as “territoriality”, which is one of the errors that a global power commits. Territoriality is when global powers “fall to defending some remote frontier...the maintenance of bases (Singapore for Britain or the protection of the route to India) comes to be seen as an irreducible priority after their most useful life has passed.”<sup>17</sup> And the global power then begins to decline. This idea of the trap of territoriality is also very similar to the later idea of imperial overstretch that was described by Paul Kennedy’s *Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. In his influential work, Kennedy argues that before its decline, the British Empire was overstretched, and that the U.S. might be going through the same crisis today. Other have echoed this sentiment and argue that the U.S. is speeding its own decline by not retrenching.<sup>18</sup> Indeed some have argued that the best option for great powers that are facing decline, is to retrench of their own accord and scale back their global commitments and ambitions in order to preserve some semblance of power and might be able to eventually regain their former position.<sup>19</sup> This idea that the U.S. might be going through imperial overstretch could be used to explain why there have been reductions in the number of U.S. bases overseas; in order to consolidate its global position rather than suffer from irrevocable decline.

This explanation for the reduced number of U.S. bases overseas is overly simplistic as it too only considers the number of bases and assumes that this means either a decline in the power of the U.S. or an attempt by it to retrench and pull back from its global commitments. The idea of imperial overstretch can be used to justify some reductions

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<sup>17</sup> Modelski, 232.

<sup>18</sup> Layne 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Parent and MacDonald.

in troop and base numbers as the U.S. attempts to deal with a financial crisis which, among other things, has resulted in the declaration that the U.S. will not longer sustain large enough forces for long term “large-scale, prolonged stability operations”<sup>20</sup>. Yet this does not explain all of the changes that have occurred in basing worldwide.

### **1.2.3 Base Politics of the Host State**

There is also theory of ‘base politics’ that was advanced by Alexander Cooley. Cooley has proposed that an important, if not the most important element that the establishment of basing agreements is the political state of the host country. According to Cooley, the debate over American imperialism assumes that the US is able to establish bases in any location with relative ease. The realities are that some weak countries contest and politicize the issue of basing. While countries in Europe, where there is assumed to have been a rift in relation because of the Iraq war, the cooperation on basing rights remains relatively high.

To understand the relation between domestic politics and the establishment of these bases, we have to make the assumption that host country rulers value above all else their own political survival. These rulers can use bases to extract more resources from the US in order to compensate their domestic constituencies and they can use the excuse of domestic constraints during their negotiations with the US in order to strengthen their position during negotiations. Some of the benefits that a host country receives include security from external aggression allowing the host to reduce spending on defense and increase spending on their constituencies to enhance their

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<sup>20</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance 2012, 6.

survival. Other benefits include economic aid assistance packages that can be given to the host country, or prestige and legitimacy afforded through association with the US and the West. This view brings Cooley to the conclusion that host countries can be classified into 3 different types: 1) Consolidated democracies which offer the highest credibility and stability for the maintenance of military bases after an agreement is reached. 2) Authoritarian regimes which might be able to conclude agreements independent of public opinion or any national institutions, but because of this factor, authoritarian regimes can terminate basing agreements unilaterally as well. 3) finally, democratizing regimes offer the least credibility because the agreements by previous regimes are not seen as legitimate and because political parties take advantage of fragmentation in the system by politicizing the basing issue in order to garner support. Cooley's theory of base politics is an excellent explanation for the reasons behind the shutting down of bases in countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkey, closures that can be explained as political expediency and a way to garner legitimacy for the regime. In the case of Turkey, the limiting of access to bases only occurred during the Iraq invasion, until today we can see that the number of bases in turkey between 2002 and 2013 have been reduced by a total of 3 sites only.<sup>21</sup> This might indicate that the actions that were taken by Turkey was political posturing by a party (the Islamist Justice and Development Party) that gained power in late 2002 and the vote to grant access to U.S. forces for the invasion of Iraq was their first major issue vote. Furthermore, an informal vote the day before showed that a majority supported the granting of access, which might have led some parliamentary members to switch their vote to 'no', believing that there it was safe to do so.<sup>22</sup> This means that the restriction

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<sup>21</sup> Department of Defense, Base Structure Report, 2002, 2013.

<sup>22</sup> Cooley, Ch. 4.



of access to U.S. forces was most likely a domestic political issue rather than a cost-imposing strategy and de-legitimization.

Cooley's theory of base politics is narrow enough by taking into account the domestic constraints that host countries experience and their desire at times to politicize the issue of basing to garner public support for the government, to explain many of the changes and shutdown requests by host countries. Yet because it does not take into account the changing methods of gaining access to regions around the world through bi-lateral agreements, it fails to provide a more nuanced explanation of certain changes that have occurred with in the U.S. basing system.

#### **1.2.4 Changing Environment and Advancing Technology**

Another way of explaining the changing basing structure of the U.S. is through looking at the changing forms of threats in the post-Cold War world, as well as the changing and advancing capabilities in the field of military technology. U.S. military bases during the cold war where large Main Operating Bases (MOBs) that housed large numbers of soldiers and their family members as well. These bases were relevant at the time because the threats that the U.S. faced where known (Soviet Union) and so the bases where placed in areas where conflict might have arisen. In today's world, most of threats that the U.S. faces are of an asymmetrical nature, and as such, smaller Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are going to be needed in order to keep U.S. military presence in diffused areas where they can be deployed to different

regions.<sup>23</sup> This might explain changes in basing structure such as increasing number of smaller bases and decreasing numbers of larger bases. Despite this, not all of the large MOB's will be closed because, as Duke has pointed out, the kind of investment in infrastructure that occurred during the Cold War cannot be repeated without difficulty.

According to Blaker, most of the military bases that were shut down after the end of the Cold War, were shut abandoned by the U.S. of its own accord because those sites were seen as redundant and no longer need. Those sites were then shut down in order to save on maintenance costs. There were of course some states that were the ones to request the U.S. to shut down and evacuate its bases. Those countries that were the ones to request the shut downs include: France, Yugoslavia, Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and a few others. The shut downs that occurred for the redundant sites occurred because many of them were established with the aim of defeating the Axis powers during the Second World War were no longer necessary for the containment of the Soviet Union.<sup>24</sup> After the Cold War many of the bases that are being reduced can also be understood to be a part of a shift of strategy, since the bases that existed to contain the Soviet Union are no longer necessary for the new threats that are faced by the U.S.

Technology also plays an important role in the decision to maintain, acquire or abandon military bases. As has been shown earlier, bases during WWI were established on the basis of the ability to reach them by planes from other U.S. sites.

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<sup>23</sup> Simon Duke, "Under Paid, Under Sexed and on the Way Out? The Past, Present and Future of US basing in Europe." *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. Vol. 51. (Amsterdam: IOS, 2009. 3-16.) Print. (Henceforth: Duke)

<sup>24</sup> James R Blaker, *United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma*. (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1990.) Print. (Henceforth: Blaker)

This is why, as has been shown by Harkavy, the number of U.S. bases dropped shortly after the end of the World War II, among other reasons, because newer planes with longer ranges were developed that allowed certain bases to be redundant. For example, better range allowed the route to Europe to go through the Azores rather than the older route through Iceland-Britain.<sup>25</sup> Another example is that in 1942, the U.S. had to use several bases in order to resupply British troops in the Middle East, going through Florida – Cuba – Trinidad – British Guyana – Recife – Takoradi – Kano – Khartoum. When the U.S. was aiding Israel in 1973, it only had to use one base in the Azores. In 1991, bombers flew all the way from Florida to Iraq. This shows that advancing technology has reduced the number of bases required for power projection.<sup>26</sup>

This would mean that the changing structure of U.S. basing has more to do with the evolving military technology, than it has with domestic politics of host states or with declining power.

This view is a very narrow one and is able to fill in gaps of explanation where others take a very large view of the changing nature of U.S. basing. This explanation can be coupled with Cooley's theory of base politics in order to explain some of the change that otherwise could not be explained. Despite this, there are still some changes that can only be understood by looking at the changing nature of basing access to one of bi-lateral agreements granting access to a host nation's bases.

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<sup>25</sup> Harkavy, 31.

<sup>26</sup> Harkavy, 26.

### 1.2.5 Social Impact

The negative social impact that the bases have on their host societies might result in a backlash from the local population and result in domestic pressure to reduce the number of foreign bases or eliminate them all together. This might explain the decreasing number of sites around the world and the relative increase in the number of smaller bases compared with larger ones.

There have been some who argued that the presence of military bases have instigated security dilemmas which is the paradoxical increase in insecurity through attempts to gain security.<sup>27</sup> Several authors have argued that the attacks on the U.S. on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September resulted from the basing of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, a country that holds two of the holiest sites in Islam; Mecca and Medina. Chalmers Johnson has compared the 9/11 attacks to the Sepoy Mutiny against the British in India when native soldiers retaliated against British control of their lands and the perceived humiliations that come with such control.<sup>28</sup> This kind of argument states that because the US is fighting to maintain its control and dominance in the world, presumably to enhance its own security, the action it takes results in exactly the opposite.

The security dilemma can also be seen in ways other than the existence of terrorist groups. Military bases create many issues for the host community which result from issues that arise from a foreign military presence in the host country. This can be seen in cases that arise in countries such as Japan and South Korea, countries that host the

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<sup>27</sup> Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis." *Security Studies*, Vol. 8, No.3, (2009): 590.

<sup>28</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*. (New York: Metropolitan, 2004). E-Book. Ch.: 5, Para: 19-22. (Henceforth: Johnson)

second and third largest presence of U.S. troops in the world respectively. The issues that arise from the presence of U.S. bases range from environmental problems, criminal and jurisdictional controversies, noise and even land use.

Gillem shows that many of the bases that the U.S. maintains abroad are built to resemble suburban America. This is done, to give service people a sense of familiarity and comfort. A comparison of Misawa city in Japan and Misawa airbase makes this kind of difference in the use of land glaringly obvious. The density of housing in Misawa airbase is about 1.25 per 1000 square meters while the city has an average density of 3.75 dwellings per 1000 square meters. The amount of lawn spaces alone in Misawa airbase is equivalent to 41 square meters per occupant.<sup>29</sup> In a survey of 1200 South Koreans living near military bases, the biggest complaint given against military bases was the massive use of land.

There have been other incidents such as what is known as the Cavalese that resulted in mass opposition to the US presence in the region and the country. The incident involved a US marine aircraft that was based at the Aviano airbase. The aircraft was flying lower and faster than is allowed by Italian regulations and severed a gondola cable that resulted in the deaths of 20 people.<sup>30</sup> There was also the incident in South Korea in 2002, when two South Korean girls who were on their way to a birthday party were crushed to death by a US armored vehicle. At first the US was not going to prosecute the soldiers responsible, but after massive demonstrations by thousands of South Koreans, the US charged both soldiers with negligent homicide and tried them

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<sup>29</sup> Mark L Gillem, "Homeward Bound: Assessing the Geopolitical Ramifications of Sprawl." *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. Vol. 51. (Amsterdam: IOS, 2009.) Print: 110.

<sup>30</sup> Monteleone, 140.

in a military tribunal. Both soldiers were acquitted of any wrong doing in what was considered by many to have been a sham trial.<sup>31</sup> There have also been 13,128 criminal cases worldwide reported by the Advocate General of the Army in 1990, from these cases, the US received sole jurisdiction for 11,751 cases, or 89%.<sup>32</sup>

This kind of humiliation that is felt by host communities results in resentment towards the sending country and might result in domestic pressure on the host government to put an end to the presence of foreign soldiers in their territories. These kinds of feelings amongst the members of the host society might lead the U.S. to reduce the number and size of its bases overseas in order to reduce its social footprint. This would be a good explanation for many of the base closures that have occurred over time and the increase in the number of small sites, which are meant to reduce the social impact of the bases on host societies. Also, the desire to be less visible can explain the use of bi-lateral agreements that have been signed between the U.S. and several countries that used to host bases but no longer do. Yet without the previous explanations of overstretch, technological changes and changes in the type of threats that the U.S faces, then this alone is also insufficient at explaining all of the changes that have occurred.

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<sup>31</sup> French, Howard W., and Don Kirk. "American Policies and Presence Under Fire in South Korea." *New York Times* 8 Dec 2002, Archives. Web. 4 Apr. 2014. <<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/28/world/bush-apologizes-to-koreans-for-killing-of-2-girls-by-gi-s.html>>.

<sup>32</sup> Eichelman, Mark E. "International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States Military." *Army Lawyer*. August (2000): 23.

### 1.3 Argument

As we have seen above, there are many different methods to explaining the changing structure and system of U.S. basing, all of which, as adept as they are explaining particular changes, are not individually adequate to explaining the overall changes to U.S. basing that are being witnessed today. One reason is that the theories that have been advanced are assuming that the U.S. is a hegemonic power of the same status of as the past hegemonic power that have been assessed. But as Wohlforth has said, “the nineteenth century was not a “Pax Britannica.” From 1815 to 1853, it was a Pax Britannica et Russica; from 1853 to 1871, it was not a pax of any kind; and from 1871 to 1914, it was a Pax Britannica et Germanica. Similarly, the Cold War was not a Pax Americana, but a Pax Americana et Sovietica. Now the ambiguity is gone”<sup>33</sup> Harkavy also points to the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War is unprecedented since the U.S. rose to being the global hegemon without having to fight a hegemonic war.<sup>34</sup> This further enforces the idea that the U.S. is unique in its hegemony, and as such cannot have the existing hegemonic theories applied to it.

Wohlforth says further that “the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical. To describe this unprecedented quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent “moment” is profoundly mistaken.”<sup>35</sup> For this reason, another method of analysis must be used in order to truly understand the U.S. basing structure overseas. This

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<sup>33</sup> William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): 39. (Henceforth: Wohlforth)

<sup>34</sup> Harkavy, 148.

<sup>35</sup> Wohlforth, 7

method that can be more adequate at explaining these changes will utilize all of the above-mentioned theories and methods of explanation. Certain changes can be answered using one method of explanation while other changes will need to be assessed through an amalgamated lens of several different methods. Without taking into account a wide array of explanations for the changing structure of military basing, it will be near to impossible to understand the changes in something as complex as hegemonic military basing overseas.

#### **1.4 Structure and methodology**

The paper will utilize Base Structure Reports that are published by the Department of Defense (DoD) on a yearly basis. These reports include all facilities and structure used (owned or leased) by the DoD worldwide. The inclusion of the acreage allotted to each facility, along with the PRV<sup>36</sup> (plant replacement value) of each site, allows for a better understanding of what trends are occurring in the U.S. military basing structure world wide, where they are moving, and where they are receiving additional ‘value’ in comparison to the past.

The information gathered on bases and personnel will be used to better understand what the trends in U.S. military basing has been since the end of the cold war, and from that try to understand what the future might hold for U.S. military bases; If they are on the decline and what that might mean, or if they are shifting to suit geo-strategic needs etc.

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<sup>36</sup> Plant Replacement Value is defined by the DoD as the cost entailed in replacing the facility, including its infrastructure, using the construction costs (material, labor etc.) of the date on which it was published.



This method of using *Base Structure Reports* has the disadvantage that it only deals with the official sites and does not list the many facilities that are used by the U.S. but are not officially owned or leased to the U.S. by the host country. This results in the creation of some gaps in the data that will be partially addressed through the use of published data on personnel stationed around the world by the Defense Manpower Data Centre in their *Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/Country* reports. These personnel data might help fill in gaps that might occur from the incomplete information taken from the Base Structure Reports, though admittedly still not the full picture. Further research can be carried out on the issue of U.S. basing overseas with a focus on the bi-lateral agreements that the U.S. has established with other countries, since a comprehensive analysis of those agreements would supplement the information in this thesis and give a better overall view of the changing basing structure of the U.S.

The next chapters of this research paper will be organized as follows; chapter two will be concerned with detailing the overall development of U.S. military bases after the Cold War as well as the strategic benefits that are derived from the possession of overseas bases. Chapter three will be concerned with understanding the major shifts in U.S. basing structure in Europe, with a focus on Germany and Southern Europe which are seeing large changes in U.S. basing structure. Chapter four will be concerned with addressing the major changes in basing in Asia with a focus on countries such as Japan and South Korea, both of which present different trends that are occurring with the U.S. basing structure in a single region. Finally, chapter five will deal shortly with the changing basing structure in South America and Africa – Middle East regions.

## 1.5 A Note on the Data

All of the information for base numbers and locations during the Cold War were taken from Blaker (1990). The information presented by Blaker was adjusted to suit the research methods of this thesis; the number of bases listed by Blaker as being in the 'Pacific' and 'South Asia' regions were merged into 'Asia'. The base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean which was listed under the 'Africa – Middle East' region by Blaker has been moved to the 'Asia' region to suit the arrangement of this thesis. Additionally, Blaker identifies bases not by the individual listing of sites as is done in the Department of Defense's *Base Structure Reports*, which is how the number of sites were tallied for this thesis. Blaker organizes the number of sites by grouping different installations within a 25-mile radius of a population center or city into a single listing as a base. This makes the number of bases identified by Blaker fewer than those listed by the Department of Defense and of this thesis as well. That means that the bases listed for the Cold War period do not give an accurate comparison to the number of military sites listed by this thesis for the years of 2001-2013. The information on the number of bases by Blaker during the Cold War should be taken only as a comparison of the changing number of bases across the different regions over time as well as to show the degree of the decrease in the number of bases overseas during the period of the Cold War.

The remaining information on the number of bases from 2001 onwards was compiled from the Department of Defense's *Base Structure Reports*, which are published annually. These reports list individual sites in each host country, along with acreage

and Plant Replacement Value (PRV), which is counted in millions of dollars. The *Base Structure Reports* from 2002 onwards provide a definition for what constitutes a ‘large’, ‘medium’, ‘small’ or ‘other’ sites. These definitions are based on the PRV of the facilities and change over time. ‘Other’ sites on the other hand have remained with the same definition; under a ten million PRV or under 10 acres in size. The 2001 Base Structure Report does not include a definition for the size of the individual site, so for the purposes of this thesis, the PRV assigned for site categorization in 2002 was adjusted for inflation to 2001 levels and applied in order to be able to sort the different sizes of the sites.

## Chapter 2: History and Benefits of Basing

### 2.1 History of U.S. basing Structure

After the declaration of independence from the British Empire and eight years after the Constitution of the United States was signed, president George Washington decided to not run for office for a third term. In his farewell address to the nation, he gives guidance on how the fragile republic should govern its affairs in the future. He warned the country from forming permanent alliances with other countries and of being entangled in the affairs of Europe.<sup>37</sup> This isolationist mindset was reflected in how the country arranged its military bases. Most of the military bases that the U.S. possessed early on were established within its territories and located along the coast where they could repel attack from the sea.<sup>38</sup> This isolationism was increasingly difficult for the republic to maintain after its growth and the apparent inevitability of it becoming a future world power, which was predicted as far back as the early 19th century by Tocqueville.<sup>39</sup> The application of U.S. power began with the Monroe Doctrine where U.S. hegemony was asserted on the Western Hemisphere when it was declared that, “the American continents...are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”<sup>40</sup> This power was further

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<sup>37</sup> U.S. Congress. *Farewell Address of President Washington to the People of the United States*. George Washington. 106th Congress, 2nd session. Published 2000.

<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey Engel, "Over There... to Stay This Time: The Forward-Deployment of American Basing Strategy in the Cold War and Beyond." *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. Vol. 51. (Amsterdam: IOS, 2009.) 17-28. Print (Henceforth: Engel)

<sup>39</sup> Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. EBook # 815. (Gutenberg, 21 Jan. 2006.) Web: Conclusion <<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/815/815-h/815-h.htm#link2HCH0045>>.

<sup>40</sup> Hugh Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*. (London: Penguin, 2001.) Print: 255. (Henceforth: Brogan)

asserted with President Roosevelt and his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine where he asserted that the U.S. had the authority to intervene in Latin America as long as it can make a case for its actions.<sup>41</sup> This was the beginning of a further break with the U.S.'s isolationist past and a move towards its future role as a major power in international relations.

After the First World War, most of the bases that the U.S. possessed overseas were scrapped and the U.S. only maintained the bases that it had acquired in the late 19th century, most of which were gained after the Spanish-American war of 1898. Before the break out of World War II, the U.S. had bases in Panama, Cuba, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Midway, Wake and Guam among others, yet it was not as large as it became after the war or as large as other countries at the time such as Britain, France, Germany and Japan.<sup>42</sup> The US gained a truly global presence with military bases spanning the globe only after World War II, starting with the 'destroyers for bases agreement with the U.K. which gave the U.S. a 99 year lease on many of the bases that were to become an integral part of the future U.S. global basing presence.

After the end of the war, the U.S. wished to maintain as many bases as possible, even if they did not need them for any specific purpose at the time. An example of this is that there were 53 overseas sites that the navy designated for development, 30 of those sites were not required for immediate use but instead were meant to be used when the contingency called for it. As one admiral said "we do not necessarily need to have shore bases at all the sites listed, but we had to have exclusive rights to build and control bases wherever we deem necessary."<sup>43</sup> As Engel Rightfully point out, this

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<sup>41</sup> Brogan, 452.

<sup>42</sup> Blaker, 9-10.

<sup>43</sup> Blaker, 9-10.

kind of land grab was only possible during a time of war when normal rules of diplomacy were lifted.

During the cold war, the containment of the Soviet Union resulted in the formalization and normalization of the maintenance of hundreds military installations around the world during peacetime.<sup>44</sup> This truly began the U.S. global presence, which resulted in military bases spanning the globe, which allowed the U.S. to intervene in conflicts around the world. At the beginning of World War II, the U.S. possessed about 100 bases; it ended the war with over 2,000 different bases overseas. One significant trend that was pointed out by Blaker is that after the massive build up of military bases around the world in the lead up and during World War II, the U.S. has actually been decreasing the number of bases that it possessed overseas. From 1945 to 1947 the U.S. cut the number of overseas basing by half, and again by another half from 1947-1949.<sup>45</sup> This trend was only interrupted by increases in the number of bases during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. As of the end of 2012, the U.S. maintained 598 declared “sites” that span 39 countries worldwide, not including U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa, which maintain another 97 sites.<sup>46</sup>


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<sup>44</sup> Johnson 2004.

<sup>45</sup> Blaker, 20-31.

<sup>46</sup> Department of Defense, Base Structure Report FY 2013.

**Figure 1: Number of U.S. bases overseas, 1947-2013.<sup>47</sup>**



Blaker identifies three reasons for this trend in the decreasing number of military bases around the world after the end of World War II. 1) The most important one according to him is the obvious fact of demobilization after the war and that most of the bases that spouted after the war lost their use. 2) The general desire by countries such as Britain, France, Australia, Denmark and New Zealand to reassert their sovereignty led to a decrease in the number of facilities in some of these countries. 3) Technological advancement and the increase in range of aircraft led to some bases being made redundant since they can now be bypassed as stop overs on certain routes.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Information on bases from 1947-1988 was taken from Blaker (1990). Information on bases from 2001-2013 was taken from the Department of Defense's Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year: 2001 - 2013. There is a discrepancy between the information taken from Blaker and those analyzed from the Base Structure Report for the Fiscal Years of 2001-2013. This chart is only meant to give an idea of the decreasing numbers of U.S. bases overseas. Please see the 'Note on Data' section in the Introduction Chapter.

<sup>48</sup> Blaker, 31.

The majority of the bases that the U.S. maintains are located in a handful of countries that are listed in Table 2.1 for the fiscal year of 2013, along with the total PRV for the facilities within the country, the categorization of the military sites, as well as the acreage and the personnel stationed in the country.

**Table 2.1: Basing details for Germany, Japan, South Korea and Italy.**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Small</b>	<b>Medium</b>	<b>Large</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Acreage</b>	<b>PRV</b>	<b>Personnel</b>
<b>Germany</b>	101	6	3	70	180	142,612	40,728	45,596
<b>Japan</b>	54	6	6	43	109	126,447	45,284	52,692
<b>South Korea</b>	33	2	3	45	83	34,011	15,098	28,500
<b>Italy</b>	18	2	0	38	58	5,397	8,268	10,916

As we can see in table 2.1, the combined total number of military sites in these four countries is 430. This means that about 72 percent of the total number of military sites overseas is located in only four countries world wide. This is one element of the U.S. basing strategy that is explained by Cooley’s base politics theory which argues that consolidated democracies are reliable allies and not likely to politicize the U.S. basing access in their countries.

From 2001 onwards, the U.S. has seen a significant decrease in the number of overseas military sites that it possesses. Between 2001 and 2013 there has been an overall decrease of about 19 percent in the number of military sites. Despite this decrease in the actual numbers, there has actually been an increase of about 22% in the value of the facilities that the U.S. maintains. This means that even with decreasing numbers, the maintenance of the overall basing structure of the U.S. is becoming more expensive which makes the choosing of which bases to shut down and which to retain a very important one.



**Table 2.2: Snapshot view of U.S. basing structure in 2001 and 2013.**

Overall	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acreage	PRV
2001	459	23	13	244	739	683,633	114,080.60
2013	237	18	18	325	598	636,329	138,621.50
Change	-48%	-22%	+38%	+33%	-19%	-7%	+22%

The increases in the number of large bases have fluctuated over the years, but comparing snapshots of 2001 and 2013 in table 2.2, we see that the increase in large bases have occurred in 3 countries: Germany in 2006, Spain in 2010 and South Korea in 2010 and 2011. Japan has also seen a large increase in large bases in 2010, but has since been seeing a reduction of bases, from 9 to 6 in 2013. Despite this recent trend in reduction, Japan still has a higher number of large bases in 2013 than it did in 2001.

Unlike the increase in large bases which have occurred in only 4 countries. The increases in ‘other’ sites have occurred in most host countries regardless of the region in which they are located.

This difference in decreasing overall number of bases, while at the same time seeing increases in the number of ‘large’ and ‘other’ military sites in certain countries is the puzzle that will be addressed in the coming chapters.

## **2.2 Strategic Uses for Military Bases**

The U.S. decided to maintained a large number of overseas bases after World War II, rather than dismantle the bases it had acquired, as it had done after World War I. One reason for this was the idea that the U.S., because of its efforts in the lead up to

victory during WWII, needed to maintain the bases that it had acquired in order to prevent the outbreak of new conflict in the world.<sup>49</sup> Another reason was out of fear, that the US wanted to protect it self from an “uncertain enemy and a non-existent threat.”<sup>50</sup> This fear was the result of advancing technologies that have made the protective oceans that are on either side of the North American continent more easily traversed, rendering the country more vulnerable to attack from the outside.

Of the most important role that overseas basing plays, is its ability to allow a country to project its power abroad. This is shown by Blaker to be one of the reasons that the U.S. began acquiring large numbers of bases in the lead up to and during WWII. The U.S. used these bases as a bridge, facilitating movement from the U.S. mainland to theaters of operations in both Europe and the Pacific.<sup>51</sup> He further shows that most of the bases established by 1943 were chosen on the basis of their ability to be reached by planes from other locations held by the U.S.<sup>52</sup> This means that the bases were chosen for their ability to connect the U.S. to other sites and to allow it to project power to those areas where it deemed necessary.

It has also been argued by Beckley that for the U.S., some of the advantages of maintaining its military power and presumably its basing, is that it allows the U.S. to achieve its strategic interests without the need to actually go to war or to use force, but by “shifting military units around” instead.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Engel.

<sup>50</sup> Engel, 21.

<sup>51</sup> Blaker, 12.

<sup>52</sup> Blaker, 24.

<sup>53</sup> Michael Beckley. "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12): 48.

One of the other reasons for the maintenance of military bases and the stationing of forces abroad historically has been to use them as a ‘trip-wire’. This basically means, placing US forces in the line of fire, so that if a country decides to attack another country where US forces are stationed, then the resulting casualties will force the hand of politicians into committing militarily. U.S. military forces act in such a way that the aggressing country will know that by attacking, they will force the hands of the U.S. into counterattacking; thus, the bases function as a deterrent. These forces also formalize the US’s commitment to specific countries.<sup>54</sup>

Further reasons for the acquisition of military bases include the strategy of denial and the strategy of pre-emption. The strategy of denial is the attempt to create alliances with countries in order to influence their decision on granting basing rights to other countries. The strategy of pre-emption on the other hand is the actual use of a certain facility even if it is not needed, in order to block its use by other countries.<sup>55</sup> This is what the U.S. was doing, according to Harkavy, when it acquired many bases in Latin America during WWII, to prevent German access to them.<sup>56</sup>

Posen has argued that the U.S. needs to maintain some basing structure that will allow it to continue to have ‘command of the commons’ of air, sea and space. This argument is based the assumption that hegemonic power in the modern world is based on its ability to control the commons of air, sea and space. This is an argument that builds on the ideas that older states based their power on their control of the commons

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<sup>54</sup> Johnson, Ch. 6, Para 1.

<sup>55</sup> Antonio J Telo, “Foreign Bases and Strategies in Contemporary Portugal.” *Military Bases: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Challenges*. Edited by Luis Rodrigues and Sergiy Glebov. Vol. 51. (Amsterdam: IOS, 2009.) Print: 146.

<sup>56</sup> Blaker, 11.

of the sea, which allowed them to project power as far as their ships can go.<sup>57</sup> His argument is a middle ground in the debate on U.S. power retention, between ‘primacy’ and ‘selective engagement’. Posen argues that the development of Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) weapons will make the U.S.’s projection of power into certain areas, which he calls the ‘Contested Zones’ more difficult. He defines contested zones as areas that are close to enemy held territories, “where weak adversaries have a good chance of doing real damage to U.S. forces.”<sup>58</sup> As a result of this, the US should rethink its strategy of primacy, which he defines as an “omnicapable military power... that aims self-confidently to master the “contested zones”... a unilateral global offensive capability.”<sup>59</sup> The U.S., according to this logic, should only aim to maintain its superiority in the commons of air, space and sea. This strategy will still call for the maintenance of a certain number of bases overseas to allow the U.S. to maintain its supremacy in the commons. This strategy will allow the U.S. to maintain its power without wasting effort on projecting power into the contested zones where A2/AD capabilities can cause significant damage.

There is also an economic benefit that must be considered. In the past, bases usually existed alongside naval stations as well as factories or points of economic interest; this is similar to what occurred during the British Empire under private companies that used military bases to advance trade and other economic interests.<sup>60</sup> . Though there is no longer the element of direct control of economic resources that used to exist in the times of empire, there are still economic benefits that are gained from

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<sup>57</sup> Harkavy; Modelski.

<sup>58</sup> Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security* Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003): 22. (Henceforth: Posen)

<sup>59</sup> Posen, 45.

<sup>60</sup> Harkavy, 15.

maintaining military power abroad. Johnson for example has argued that the U.S. has used its military and diplomatic power in order to open foreign markets for itself.<sup>61</sup> Others have framed this in less imperial terms, such as the use of military power to protect “the global economic commons”<sup>62</sup> from threats and underwriting the security needed for international trade and that the U.S. security guarantees to its allies have provided the basis for the global economy.<sup>63</sup>

### **2.3 Conclusion**

It seems that with a look at the overall basing structure that the U.S. maintains worldwide, then the decreasing number of bases might signify that either the theory of imperial overstretch or the long-cycle theory might hold true. Imperial overstretch would explain the changes by arguing that because the U.S. is undergoing a financial crises and because it has made too many commitment worldwide, that it is now pulling back from its commitments in order to retrench and attempt to save it self from a complete collapse.<sup>64</sup> The long cycle theory would argue on the other hand that the U.S. is in its third phase of coalition building as a hegemon. This would mean that the U.S. is facing opposition and de-legitimization as a global power and so other countries are opposing it by imposing cost imposing strategies through the denial of basing access which results in a smaller number of military bases overseas.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Johnson, Ch. 9.

<sup>62</sup> Stephen G Brooks, G John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth. “Don’t Come Home America: The Case against Retrenchment.” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/2013): 41

<sup>63</sup> G. John Ikenberry, "American Hegemony And East Asian Order." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 58, No. 3 (2004): 357.

<sup>64</sup> Layne; MacDonald and Parent.

<sup>65</sup> Monteleone.

Though the answer that the U.S. is either retrenching or losing support as a global power might seem to be the case when looking at the overall decreasing numbers of bases. This answer becomes less capable of explaining the changes that are occurring regionally and country-specific changes. The problem is the decreasing numbers alone don't give the full picture because they do not address specific regional and country-by-country changes. This detailed look at the U.S. basing structure will be carried out in the next three chapters in order to better understand what is actually occurring with U.S. basing overseas.

The next chapter will look at the detailed basing structure in Europe and explain what those changes mean. Chapter four will look at the basing structure in Asia, while chapter five will look at the changes occurring in Africa –Middle East and South American regions.

## Chapter 3: Changes in Europe

### 3.1 Overview

A clear trend begins to appear in the number of changing bases during the Cold War.<sup>66</sup> The only area that consistently saw increases in the number of sites during the Cold War was Europe, which initially saw the number of sites first drop from 506 in 1947 to 258 in 1949. After 1949 the number of sites in Europe continue to increase through the cold war reaching a high of 673 in 1967 and then 627 by 1988.

During the Cold War, Europe was the most important region for U.S. basing, as it held the majority of U.S. military personnel and military sites. Table 3.1 shows the number of U.S. bases, the percentage of U.S. bases in Europe out of the total for overseas bases and the number of U.S. personnel stationed in Europe<sup>67</sup> along with the equivalent percentage.<sup>68</sup>

**Table 3.1**

Year	U.S. Bases in Europe	As a percentage of overseas total	U.S. Military Personnel in Europe <sup>69</sup>	As a percentage of overseas total
1947	506	44%	Missing Data	Missing Data
1949	258	44%	Missing Data	Missing Data
1953	446	55%	388,349	32%
1957	566	64%	413,160	47%
1967	673	64%	330,286	27%
1975	633	73%	279,553	69%
1988	627	79%	356,251	64%

<sup>66</sup> All data on the number and locations of bases during the Cold War are taken from Blaker.

<sup>67</sup> All data on personnel is taken from the Department of Defense's quarterly 'Active Duty Military Personnel strengths by Regional Area and by Country'.

<sup>68</sup> All percentages are rounded to the closest figure.

<sup>69</sup> Personnel data for Europe includes the Azores, Iceland, Greenland and forces afloat or enroute. Numbers do not include the USSR or Newfoundland as there is no distinction made by Blaker between forces stationed in Newfoundland and Canada.

It is clear from the data in table 3.1 that the number of bases in Europe were increasing until reaching a high point of 673 bases in 1967, after that the number of bases begin declining gradually until they reach 627 bases in 1988. After the Cold War, the number of bases begins to decline rapidly.

From 2001 through to 2013 Europe has seen the largest decline in the number of bases and the only region to see a drop in the overall number of military sites. Table 3.2 shows the detailed number of bases in Europe along with the percentage of the bases in Europe out of the overseas total. The table also shows the number of small, medium, large and other military sites through the same time period. Personnel Data is also listed along with the Plant Replacement Value for all the facilities located in Europe.

**Table 3.2**


Europe	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acres	PRV	Personnel
2001	337	13	4	175	529	424,942	61,996.1	122,213
2002	338	10	4	178	530	Missing	Missing	Missing
2003	326	10	4	170	510	443,146	60,536.7	108,269
2004	362	10	4	194	570	451,550	60,939.3	101,743
2005	330	9	4	166	509	430,727	62,488.1	106,008
2006	341	10	5	123	479	429,640	61,657.7	102,543
2007	334	11	5	183	533	431,839	66,359.0	92,773
2008	306	9	3	167	485	426,463	59,048.9	82,743
2009	297	9	4	142	452	410,935	59,743.8	74,635
2010	243	6	7	157	413	405,102	60,909.1	77,863
2011	231	9	6	118	364	405,596	62,771.3	85,219
2012	248	9	8	141	406	410,045	70,211.9	84,653
2013	140	10	6	187	343	405,249	63,390.7	71,789

One of the clearest trends in the overseas basing structure of the U.S. in Europe is the major decline in the number of military sites in Europe, which is the only region that has seen declines since 2001 and is the main cause for the decline in the overall



number of overseas military sites. Europe has seen an overall decline of 186 sites in comparison to 2001 numbers. This is a very large decrease considering the fact that the total decrease in overall sites in foreign territories is only 141 sites over the same time period. This reduction in the number of military sites in Europe has been offset by increases in other regions, which will be discussed in later chapters. Figure 3.1 shows the reduction in the percentage of U.S. bases in Europe in comparison to the overseas number of military sites between 2001 and 2013.

**Figure 3.1**



What can also be seen clearly in table 3.2 is that there has been an increase in the number of ‘large’ military sites; there has been an increase of two large bases in Germany and one in Spain. Iceland on the other hand has seen a decrease of one large base over the same period.

The following sections will detail the changing number of U.S. military sites from 2001 until 2013 for Germany and Southern Europe, which are the areas within Europe that have seen the largest changes in their basing structure.

### 3.2 Germany

Germany has seen the largest decline in the number of U.S. military sites in the years between 2001 and 2013 and so deserves to have the changes that occurred on its territory studied thoroughly. Of the 186 sites that have been eliminated in Europe, 146 of those eliminations have occurred in Germany. Of course it has to be kept in mind that this large decrease in the number of military sites in Germany where only possible because Germany has historically been host to the largest number of U.S. military sites in the world.

Table 3.3 gives a snapshot of the base figures in Germany in 2001 and in 2013 in order to show the changes that have occurred in the categories of ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites, along with the total acreage for the facilities in Germany, the Plant Replacement Value and the personnel stationed in the country.

**Table 3.3**

Germany	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acreage	PRV	Personnel
2001	246	8	1	71	326	159,643	41,507.8	88,486
2013	101	6	3	70	180	142,612	40,728	45,596

As we can see from the details of 2001 and 2013, there has been a very large decrease in the overall number of military sites within Germany. The decreases have occurred in the number of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ sites, while there is an overall increase in ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites. There also seems to be a decrease in the total acreage of the facilities, the PRV and the personnel figures. The increase of the number of ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites, at the expense of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ sites in Germany fits well in the trend that is seen in the overall number of military sites overseas.

Curiously, there are 3 ‘large’ military sites in Germany, which is an increase of about 2 ‘large’ sites from 2001. The only ‘large’ site that existed in Germany in 2001, Ramstein Airbase, has seen no reductions in either PRV or acreage between 2001 and 2013. Table 3.4 shows the details for Ramstein Airbase.

**Table 3.4**

<b>Ramstein Airbase</b>	<b>Square Feet</b>	<b>Acreage</b>	<b>PRV \$Millions<sup>70</sup></b>
2001	2,419,803	3102	2799.5 (3681)
2013	9,580,715	3102	3646.6
Difference	+ 7,160,912	No Change	+ 847 (-34.4)

This shows clearly that there have been no reductions in the largest base in Germany, but that there have actually been increases in the square footage of the facilities and the PRV has also increased, if one does not account for inflation. The two new ‘large’ military sites are the Spangdahlem Airbase and East Camp Grafenwoehr; details for both are listed below in table 3.5

**Table 3.5**

<b>East Camp Grafenwoehr</b>	<b>Square Feet</b>	<b>Acreage</b>	<b>PRV \$Millions</b>
2001	4,348,235	2,698	1096.6 (1,422.5)
2013	6,859,214	2,698	2,312.2
Difference	+ 2,510,979	No Change	+ 1,216.2 (+889.7)
<b>Spangdahlem Airbase</b>	<b>Square Feet</b>	<b>Acreage</b>	<b>PRV \$Millions</b>
2001	1,333,137	1374	1191.2 (1566.9)
2013	3,863,766	1617	2,058.4
Difference	+ 2,530,629	+ 243	+ 867.2 (491.5)

These tables show clearly that both the Spangdahlem and Grafenwoehr bases have seen large increases in size (both acreage and square footage) as well as in the PRV

<sup>70</sup> PRV figures that are adjusted for inflation are indicated in brackets next to the listed figure.

for the facilities in the bases. This increase in large bases is one of the changes that cannot be explained using the imperial overstretch and the long cycle theories. These changes will be explained in the last section of this chapter.


### **3.3 Southern Europe**

Southern Europe has also seen a major shift in the U.S. basing structure with an apparent move towards that region. This change can be seen in some particular countries that have seen increases since 2001. One of the clearest increases in the numbers of sites has occurred in Italy, where in 2001 it had 52 sites and in 2013 it had 58 sites. This might be a slight increase in the number of sites, but when compared to the overall number of bases in Europe, then a stronger move becomes clear. In 2001 Italy contained 10 percent of the total number of sites located in Europe, while in 2013 it contained 18 percent. This overall trend becomes even stronger when the rest of southern European countries are taken into account.<sup>71</sup> Southern European countries went from containing 19 percent of the sites within Europe in 2001 to containing 34% of the sites in 2013. Additionally, Southern European countries went from containing 13% of the overall PRV in Europe in 2001 to 23% in 2013. These percentages are shown in figure 3.2, which shows the percentages of Southern Europe's share of the PRV and the number of sites in Europe from 2001 to 2013.

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<sup>71</sup> Southern European countries in this analysis includes Italy, Turkey, Spain, Greece and Portugal, These countries have seen an increase of 8%, 2%, 1%, 1% and 3% respectively, in the number of sites between 2001 and 2013.

**Figure 3.2**



This shows a strong trend of military sites being increasingly concentrated in Southern Europe and away from Northern and Central Europe. Table 3.4 shows details the number of sites, acreage and PRV for Southern Europe for 2001 and 2013.

**Table 3.4**

Year	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acreage	PRV	Personnel
2001	46	4	0	50	100	19,736	8,079.3	18,562
2013	24	4	1	83	112	19,208	14,955	15,098

There is a clear reduction in the number of ‘small’ sites in Southern Europe, while there is an increase in the number of ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites. ‘Medium’ sites on the other hand, despite fluctuations over the years, when comparing snapshot details of 2001 and 2013 have remained constant.

### **3.4 Explanation of the Changes seen in Europe: Germany and Southern Europe**

At first sight, it seems that the decreases in the number of U.S. military sites in Europe might signal either a retrenchment by the U.S. or the loss of support of European countries. The theory of imperial overstretch would expect to see that either the U.S. reduces the number of military sites of every category in Europe because the U.S. is scaling back on its overseas presence.<sup>72</sup> While the long cycle theory might see that the U.S. military presence in entire countries has been reduced significantly or eliminated altogether.<sup>73</sup> What the theories of imperial overstretch and long cycle theories cant explain though, is the increase in the number of large bases in Europe overall, including the addition of a ‘large’ site in Spain, two new sites in Germany as well as the overall increase in the number of military sites in Italy. Additionally, by comparing the states that were hosting U.S. military sites in 1988 to those in 2013, we see the only France is no longer a host to U.S. military sites, while Romania now is.<sup>74</sup> This shows that the idea that the U.S. is losing support of other countries and is in turn in decline, does not really match the changing details.

The major reduction in the overall number of sites in Europe, while at the same time having the continent see a rise in the number of large sites can be explained in part through Cooley’s base politics theory. According to Cooley, bases established in fully democratized states will be the most enduring and most reliable. This has been explained through his hypothesis that established democracies will honor agreements made to establish base sites even if the security environment changes and public

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<sup>72</sup> Layne; MacDonald and Parent.

<sup>73</sup> Monteleone.

<sup>74</sup> Information on host states in 1988 taken from Blaker; Information on host states in 2013 taken from the Department of Defense, Base Structure Report FY 2013.

opinions turns against the existence of these sites. This is because these basing agreements were made under democratic leadership, which means that even if the government changes, the new government will feel obliged to uphold agreements in order to maintain its credibility. Another reason identified by Cooley is that established political parties in consolidated democracies will not politicize “ideologically based policy positions in foreign policy matters in order to attract more moderate or median voters.”<sup>75</sup> The reliability of the U.S.’s European allies is in contrast to Uzbekistan which was not a consolidated democracy and ended by giving the U.S. 180 days notice for the U.S. to evacuate the Karshi-Khanad base located in the south of the country. The importance of the base to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan caused confusion for U.S. military planners.<sup>76</sup>

The U.S. basing overseas as we have seen was built over a very short time period during WWII. Blaker states that U.S. basing is unique in history because “never had so much been built in so short a time.”<sup>77</sup> These bases in Europe grew during the Cold War and the period of containment of the Soviet Union. The expense of decommissioning the bases that exist in Europe, then to re-establish them if the need arises will be prohibitively high, as we see that in 2013, the total plant replacement value for sites in Europe is estimated at over 63 billion Dollars.<sup>78</sup> Since European countries are more reliable allies to the U.S. and that the establishment of main operating bases (MOBs) on such a large scale will not be easily replicated in the future means that it is more prudent for the U.S. to maintain these MOBs in Europe to act as hubs for operations and power projection into other, nearby areas. This is

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<sup>75</sup> Cooley, Ch. 1, Para. 30-36.

<sup>76</sup> Cooley, CH. 7.

<sup>77</sup> Blaker, 21.

<sup>78</sup> Department of Defense, Base Structure Report FY 2013.

preferable than to having bases in what Cooley calls democratizing and authoritarian governments that might revoke the basing agreement made with the U.S. at any time.

What must also be kept in mind is that the strategic environment has changed dramatically since the Cold War. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stressed the fact that the U.S basing presence in Europe was created to contain the Soviet Union, while today the threats faced by the U.S. is more asymmetrical in nature and so the large presence of U.S. forces is no longer needed in the area.<sup>79</sup> The presence in Europe is needed now in another way, which is made explicit in the 2001 QDR. The review states “The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.”<sup>80</sup>

Technology is also a factor in the decision to maintain large bases in Europe. Modern technology makes the necessity of maintaining forces near or in regions where contingencies might occur is no longer necessary. Forces stationed within the U.S. can now be deployed over long distance to the location that they are being sent. Yet forward deployed forces are required to be near crises areas because those forces will be necessary to stabilize the situation until reinforcements arrive from the U.S.<sup>81</sup> The reliability of the U.S.’s European allies coupled with their strategic location in relation to Africa and the Middle East makes them perfect hosts for U.S. bases. So it seems that because of the strategic location of Europe, which along with the

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<sup>79</sup> Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, 25.

<sup>80</sup> Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 27.

<sup>81</sup> **Lostumbo et al, *Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits*. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013.) Print: xx.**



Portuguese Azores located in the Atlantic Ocean, on which the U.S. has a medium sized base, provide not only a bridge for U.S. forces to reach troubled hotspots in neighboring areas, but that they are also reliable partners that can host U.S. base sites that will allow for the rapid deployment of forces and the stationing of forward deployed forces.

Another trend that should be explained is that apparent move south and east in Europe. As we have seen, despite a general decrease in the number of bases in Europe, one country that is bucking that trend is Italy, which has seen an increase in the number of U.S. military sites in the country. We have also seen that the overall number of sites with in Europe have tilt to the south, which went from possessing 19 percent of the sites in Europe to 34 percent in 2013. This is explained by the earlier explanation that the main use for the bases in Europe today is to act as a bridge to facilitate the deployment of U.S. forces to areas in the Middle East and Africa. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance released by the Department of Defense stated that the U.S. will continue to act towards the stabilization of the Middle East through fighting terrorism, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through placing “a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in – and support of- partner nations in and around this region.”<sup>82</sup> Europe in this sense acts as the perfect platform to project power in the Middle Eastern and African Regions.

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
<sup>82</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Defense. January 2012, 2.

## Chapter Four: Changes in Asia

### 4.1 Overview

During the cold war, the number of military sites in Asia was continuously in decline except for two increases during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In 1949 there were 235 bases in Asia, this number increased to 291 by 1953, this increase was presumably to support the effort in the Korean War. After 1953, the number continues to drop until it reaches 121 sites by 1988.<sup>83</sup> Figure 4.1 illustrates the change in U.S. basing structure in Asia during the Cold War.

**Figure 4.1**<sup>84</sup>



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<sup>83</sup> Blaker, 32.

<sup>84</sup> Blaker, 32.

Figure 4.2 shows a constant trend of decreasing number of bases in Asia except for the two spikes indicating an increase at the time of the Korean and Vietnam War, respectively. This decreasing trend during the Cold War is very different from what we see today. Asia has seen the largest relative increase in U.S. military sites in the category of ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites. This is a trend that is very similar to the one seen in Europe and to the overall number of military sites overseas where there is also an increase in ‘large’ and ‘other’ military sites. The only real difference between Asia and Europe is that Europe has seen an overall decline in the number of military sites while Asia has seen an overall increase from 2001 until 2013.

The general increase in overall military sites is seen when comparing snapshots of the years 2001 and 2013, but on closer observation, year by year, it is clear that Asia as well is seeing slight reductions annually since 2005. This decrease is slower than the decrease in Europe and is still significantly higher than the historic number of military sites in Asia since the late 1940’s and as a proportion to overall sites in foreign territories. Table 4.1 shows the changing number of U.S. military sites in Asia from 2001-2013. The table also shows the number for all the categories of military sites; ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’ and ‘other’. Acreage, Plant Replacement Value (PRV) and Personnel are also listed in the table.

**Table 4.1<sup>85</sup>**

Asia	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acres	PRV	Personnel
2001	113	10	8	56	187	215,121	29,010.4	75,046
2002	111	8	12	54	131	Missing	Missing	Missing
2003	114	9	11	51	185	216,093	50,004.6	88,419
2004	180	8	10	89	287	213,829	55,097.1	91,554
2005	140	10	11	66	227	214,132	61,799	88,047
2006	164	9	9	41	223	214,171	52,158.9	76,784
2007	159	9	8	73	249	208,087	55,806	78,828
2008	139	9	8	78	234	187,021	55,111.8	65,839
2009	137	10	8	67	222	187,702	59,755	60,776
2010	135	5	12	58	210	180,926	66,613	68,552
2011	132	7	13	50	202	180,862	71,980.30	72,698
2012	134	9	12	60	215	181,294	68,280.9	Missing
2013	88	8	11	105	212	188,896	66,821.70	82,525

The PRV of Asian sites in comparison to the PRV of overall sites in foreign territories from 2001 to 2013 shows a very strong trend towards Asia as well. In 2001, the PRV of sites in Asia was \$29,010.4 (in millions) out of a total of \$114,080.6 for foreign territories; this amounts to about 25% of the total PRV for sites in foreign territories being in Asia. In 2013, the total PRV for Asian Sites was placed at \$66,821.7 out of a total 138,621.5 or 48% of the total PRV of foreign sites. This shows that the estimated value of sites in Asia, in relation to the total value of sites in foreign territories increased by 23%.

As we can see, there is a general trend towards increased proportion of the overseas basing being in Asia. In 2001 there were a total of 187 sites in Asia, while in 2013 there are a total 212 sites. Of the 212 sites in Asia, 192 are located in South Korea and Japan, while the remaining 20 sites are spread around 5 other locations (Singapore,

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<sup>85</sup> Information on the military sites from 2001 – 2013 are taken from the Department of Defense: Base Structure Reports, for each individual fiscal year. Information on Personnel is taken from Department of Defense: Active Duty Personnel Strengths by Region and Country, for each individual year. Information for South Korea in 2013 was taken from the Rogers, Simon. "US military deployments overseas mapped: how have they changed under Obama?" The Guardian. <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/interactive/2012/oct/23/us-military-deployments-overseas?commentpage=1> (accessed May 13, 2014).

Hong Kong, Australia, Marshall Islands and Diego Garcia). Because of the concentration of military sites in both Japan and South Korea, a more in depth look at the two countries is required for a better understanding of what the changes in the U.S. basing structure in Asia means.

## 4.2 Japan

Japan has seen the highest increase in the number of sites in Asia; the country has seen an overall increase in the number of site from 75 in 2001 to 109 in 2013. The number of ‘small’ sites in the country has also gone up from 36 to 54 sites. Australia has seen an increase of two sites and the Marshall Islands have also seen an increase of 10 sites. That makes South Korea, the only host nation in Asia to have a smaller number of sites within its borders in 2013 than it did in 2001, and Indonesia the only country to no longer be a host for U.S. military sites in the same time period.

Table 4.2 shows snapshot figures for the number of sites in Japan, the type of sites and the Plant Replacement Value as a total for each year.

**Table 4.2**

Japan	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acreage	PRV	Personnel
2001	36	7	5	27	75	126,536	34,213.8 (45,005)	47,040
2013	54	6	6	43	109	126,447	45,284.9	52,692

There has overall been an increase of 34 sites, most of which are either ‘small’ or ‘other’ sites. There has also been an increase in ‘large’ sites. The only category to have seen a decline in numbers is the ‘medium’ sites, which have only seen a decrease by one. Acreage has remained relatively the same, personnel has seen a slight increase, while the 2001 PRV after being adjusted for inflation comes to about

45 billion, which is close to the PRV as of 2013. This shows that the biggest changes have been in the actual number of sites that have seen an increase in almost every category.

Another aspect that should be kept in mind is that while countries like Germany have seen decreases in the number of personnel stationed within their borders, Japan has seen an increase in the number of U.S. military personnel from around 47,000 to 53,000. Counter intuitively; there have also been an increase in the number of large sites by three. The increases in large sites have occurred in Japan, which has seen one large additional site, and South Korea, which has seen an increase of 2 large sites.

### 4.3 South Korea

South Korea has, like other countries, seen changes to the U.S. basing structure within its borders. Table 4.3 lists the number of sites, the type of sites, PRV, acreage and personnel in South Korea for the years of 2001 and 2013.

**Table 4.3**

S.K	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acreage	PRV	Personnel
2001	73	3	1	24	75	59,906	10,459 (13,758)	27,185
2013	33	2	3	45	45	34,011	15,097.8	28,500

Table 4.3 shows that the U.S. basing structure in South Korea has seen changes similar to those that occurred elsewhere in Europe and to the overall number of military sites overseas. These changes include a general decrease in the number of military sites and specifically a drop in the number of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ sites while seeing an increase in ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites.

#### **4.4 Explanation for the Changes in Asia: Japan and South Korea**

The increase in the number of U.S military sites in Asia cannot be explained by the theory of imperial overstretch or by the long cycle theory, both of which expect to see declines in the number of bases either because the U.S. is actively retrenching or because host countries are pursuing a cost-imposing strategy on the U.S. by limiting basing access.<sup>86</sup> Instead we see that there has been an increase in the number of sites overall, including ‘large’ sites. Both these theories cannot explain the overall changing basing structure in Asia, or the specific changes we see in Japan and South Korea. They do not explain the changes in Japan since we see an overall increase in the number of military sites in the country. Nor do they explain the changes in South Korea because even though there is an overall decrease in the number of military sites in South Korea, we still see an increase in the number of ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites.

This overall increase in the number of military sites in Asia can be explained through the concept of the changing strategic value of the region. During the Cold War, the containment of the Soviet Union was the most important geo-strategic objective for the U.S. and so the majority of U.S. bases were in Europe. Today the rise of China might be instigating this basing move towards Asia, as the U.S. attempts to prove to China that it is not a worn out power and that it is in the Asia-Pacific region for the long haul.<sup>87</sup> The Obama Administration’s “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific

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<sup>86</sup> Layne; MacDonald and Parent; Modelski.

<sup>87</sup> Kevin Rudd. "Beyond the Pivot." *Foreign Affairs*. March/April 2013

region”<sup>88</sup> was stated in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG), that among other things addresses the issue of the rising Chinese military power as a factor that might “affect the U.S. economy and security in a variety of ways.”<sup>89</sup> The DSG also states that the U.S. should invest resources to maintain access to the region. This seems to be the most important reason why we are seeing this shift in basing strategy towards Asia.

As has been shown above, the number of military sites in Japan are unique and do not fit in with the trends seen in other countries. Japan has seen an increase in all categories of military sites except for ‘medium’ sites. Australia has also seen an increase in the number of sites in the country. Alexander Cooley’s theory of base politics is capable of explaining why we see an increase of bases in Japan and Australia. Both of these countries are consolidated democracies and as such are more likely to commit to the basing agreements established with the U.S. This means that they can reliably host U.S. military sites, providing access to the region for the U.S. without politicizing the issue of basing.

The theory of base politics on the other cant seem to explain the overall changes that occurred in South Korea which has seen a decrease in the number of U.S. military sites. As we have seen, the number of U.S. military sites in South Korea has seen an overall reduction, but at the same time has seen an increase in the number of ‘large’ and ‘other’ sites. The increase in ‘large’ sites can be explained through base politics. Because since South Korea is a consolidated democracy, the U.S. can reliably invest

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<sup>88</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance 2012, 2.

<sup>89</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance 2012, 2.



in 'large' sites in the country without fearing being expelled. The over all reductions though and the increase in 'other' sites which are considerably smaller than the different categories of sites, seem to be an indicative of attempts by the U.S. to reduce the social footprint of its military sites on the host community. South Korea, specifically, seems to be explainable through a combination of both theories; the U.S. maintains large bases because South Korea is a reliable ally, while at the same time attempting to reduce its visible presence in the country by increasingly using 'other' sites in order to prevent growing domestic pressure in South Korea against the existence these military sites.

# Chapter Five: South America and Africa - Middle East Regions

## 5.1 Overview

Despite the fact that the majority of U.S. military sites have been located in either Asia or Europe, there are certain trends that are occurring in other regions that make them worth investigating.

During the Cold War, South America, Africa and the Middle East never surpassed 20 percent of the total number of U.S. military sites overseas. Table 5.1 lists the number of bases located in the Africa - Middle East and South America along with the percentages of military sites that each region contained out of the total for overseas military sites.

**Table 5.1<sup>90</sup>**

<b>Year</b>	1947	1949	1953	1957	1667	1975	1988
<b>Latin America</b>	113	59	61	46	55	40	39
<b>Percentage of total</b>	10%	10%	7%	5%	5%	5%	5%
<b>Africa – Middle East</b>	73	27	16	14	14	8	6
<b>Percentage of total</b>	6%	5%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%
<b>Total number of military sites overseas</b>	1,139	582	815	883	1,014	865	794

As we can see from table 5.1, there has been a constant decrease in the number of military sites in both Latin America and Africa – Middle East. These regions possessed a very small proportion of the overall number of military sites.

From 2001 until 2013, there trend has changes, and we see that the number of sites in these regions have increased. Figure 5.2 details the number of sites in each region,

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<sup>90</sup> Information on bases during the Cold War is taken from Blaker.

along with the Plant Replacement Value (PRV), personnel and acreage for the years of 2001 and 2013.<sup>91</sup>

**Table 5.2**

Latin America	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acres	PRV	Personnel
2001	3	0	1	11	15	29,675	2,406.3	551
2013	3	0	1	16	20	29,584	3,921.4	1,340
Africa – Middle East	Small	Medium	Large	Other	Total	Acres	PRV	Personnel
2001	6	0	0	2	8	12,895	667.2	1,930
2013	6	0	0	16	22	9,134	2,485.7	3,606

As we can see from table 5.2, these areas have seen increases in the number of ‘other’ U.S. military sites as well as the PRV of the facilities in those regions. Despite this, the overall number of military sites in those regions does not constitute a large proportion of the overall number of sites overseas. These two regions combined account for about 5 percent of the PRV of the total PRV for military sites overseas and about 3 percent of the total number of military sites out of the overseas total.<sup>92</sup>

## **5.2 Explanation of the Changes in Latin America and Africa – Middle East**

From the above mentioned information on the number of U.S. military sites in the Africa – Middle East and the Western Hemisphere regions, it is clear that neither the long cycle theory nor the theory on imperial overstretch can explain the changes that

<sup>91</sup> Information on bases from 2001 through 2013 is taken from the Department of Defense: Base Structure Reports. The figures listed for the years 2001-2013 are not meant to be a continuation of the data for the Cold War, as Blaker divides and classifies ‘bases’ differently than is done in this thesis. The information is only supposed to give an idea of the importance each region had in regards to military basing.

<sup>92</sup> The South America figure includes Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as Canada.

are occurring in those regions. Both regions have seen an increase in the number of sites, which is the opposite of what we would expect from the theories.

Cooley's base politics theory can help us at understanding these changes a little better. The theory of base politics hypothesizes that democratizing and authoritarian countries are not reliable hosts of foreign bases. If we look at the host states in both those regions then a pattern begins to emerge. If we use the Freedom House index on country freedom ranking from their *Freedom in the World 2013* report, we see that all the host countries in the Africa – Middle East region are either partly free or not free. Of the host countries in the region Egypt, Kenya and Kuwait are ranked as 'Partly Free', while Bahrain, Oman, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates are ranked as 'Not Free'.<sup>93</sup> This is a clear indicator as to why we are not seeing any increase in the number of 'large', 'medium' or 'small' bases, instead we are seeing only an increase in the number of 'other' military sites. This could be explained through the idea that the U.S does not wish to invest in expensive and large bases in countries where basing access might be revoked on short notice. Instead, the U.S. uses its bases in Europe in order to project power into this region.

South America on the hand has several countries listed as 'Free' by Freedom House, and so another explanation can be used to understanding the changes there. One of the reasons that the U.S. maintains military bases in South America is for combating drug

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<sup>93</sup> Freedom House. *Freedom in the World 2013*. Freedom House. Web. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013#.U4yOLZSSzDM> (accessed May 29, 2014).

trafficking.<sup>94</sup> Strategically though, as Blaker has pointed out, the lack of military bases in south America denies the U.S. extensive access to the South Atlantic, which is not strategically significant. The U.S. can reach most areas in the region by deploying forces from the U.S and as such does not need to maintain bases in the area to guarantee access.<sup>95</sup>

This means that the changes for South America and Africa – Middle East regions can be explained with a combination of Cooley's base politics theory as well as the changing technological capabilities that allow for power projection into South America from the U.S. while power projection in to the Africa –Middle East region can be carried out from Europe.

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<sup>94</sup> John Lindsay-Poland, "U.S. Military Bases in Latin America and the Caribbean." *The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts*. Ed. Catherine Lutz. (Washington Square, NY: New York UP, 2009.) Print: 75

<sup>95</sup> Blaker, 50.

## Conclusion

This thesis has addressed the question regarding the changing U.S. basing structure overseas and has applied the available theories and explanations to individual regions and countries. As we have seen, no one theory can explain all the changes that are occurring with the U.S. military basing structure which is displaying variations by region and even variations amongst countries in the same region such as South Korea and Japan. The only way to explain the nuances in the changing basing structure of the U.S. can only be done through using combinations of different theories and ideas. The idea of imperial over stretch and the long cycle theory can only explain that larger trends in the changing basing structure of the U.S. but fail to explain the changes that are occurring on country-by-country bases. The combination of Cooley's base politics along with the idea of changing strategic environment and technological advances explaining the changes in Germany, Japan and Southern Europe. While changes for South Korea can be explained through the combination of Cooley's base politics and the idea of reducing the social impact on host societies. Finally the Africa – Middle East region is explained using Cooley's base politics to explain why those regions see no increases in 'large' sites, while the changing strategic environment explains why those regions have still seen increases overall. Finally, the South American region can be explained through the increasing technological capabilities that allow for power projection from the U.S. mainland into the region without the need for 'large' military sites in the region.

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